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The purpose of this paper is to orient the reader to the contentporary scientific study of consciousness.
One of the most noticeable features of research concerning consciousness is that there are three
domains of discourse, the physiological, computational and experiential, eachwith its own methodolog,,
and concerns. Vtthile confusion is often expressed about what it is that one is discussing, there are four
main categories of definitions of the term consciousness: consciousnessl is the registration, processing
and acting on information; behavioural consciousness is the explicit knowledge of one's situation,
mental stqtes or actions as demonstrated by one's behaviour; subjective consciousness is the subjective
stream of thoughts, feelings and sensations that occur for a person; and consciousreess rs the sense of
existence of the subject of mental acts. There are qlso disparate views concerning consciousness lhat
surveys have revealed to be correlatedwith investigators'beliefs about the nature of reality along a
material-transcendent dimension. Those with materialist views tend to think that only that which is
physical is reql and that consciousness is an emergent property of neural or information-processing
systems; those with conservqtively transcendent views think that lhere is more to reality than that which
is physical and emphasize subjective aspects of consciousness; while the extraordinarily transcendent
conceptualize consciousness as ontologically primitive and place intportance on self-transformation. An
investigator's contention that she has had anomalous experiences appears to incline her toward a
transcendent position. The presence ofthese correlations indicates that reseqrch progranxs concerning
consciousness proceed, not in anunbiased manner, but on the ba,sis of personal beliefs about the nohffe
of reality. Can beliefs change in the course of the educational process? Datafrom 129 undergraduate
students indicates that beliefs about consciousness and reality can moye in a transcendent direction in
classes with an instructor with extraordinarily transcendent beliefs.
1 Introduction
There has recently been a great deal of interest
concerning consciousness within the academic
community, yet the research effort has been fragmented
with many academics working at cross-purposes to one
another. What is presented here is an overview of the
contemporary study of consciousness that can serve to
provide a context for discussions concerning
consciousness. This consists of a delineation of three
domains of discourse, metanalysis of definitions of
consciousness, a discussion of the beliefs about
consciousness and reality of consciousness researchers
and the results of a study concerning changes in students'
beliefs that has implications fbr consciousness research.
2 Domains of Discourse
One of the most noticeable features of research
concerning consciousness is that there are three domains
of discourse that often have little to do with one another.
One domain of discourse, the physiological, is concerned
with an understanding of the biological processes
involved in consciousness. Th is is the realm of
neuroscience and the usual methods of biology and
observation of behaviour are used in order to gather
knowledge concerning consciousness. Somewhat
disconnected from neuroscience, although often
considered part of the physiological domain, are
discussions of the relationship between subatomic events
and consc ious ness. Th is includes discuss ions of
relationships between quantum mechanics and mind.
A second domain of discourse is the computational
whereby consciousness is discussed in terrns of
information processing. This is the area of cognitive
science which subsumes prirnarily the disciplines of
cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. In
practice, it is concerned with cognitive processes such as
thinking, language, memory, problem solving, and
creativity. One of two theoretical presuppositions is
rnade, namely, that mind results from processes
analogous to those used by colt-tputers or that it results
from the parallel distributed processing of networks of
connected units. Knowledge is derived from the
observation of behaviour, including verbal behaviour,
and from theoretical analyses.
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A third domain of discourse is the experiential involving
phenomenological, humanistic and transpersonal
approaches to consciousness. This includes discussion of
both subjective and private f'eatures of consciousness.
Knowledge is derived from introspection as well as frotn
the accounts ofothers concerning their experiences.
The first thing to note about these domains of discourse
is that they are domains of discourse, not necessarily of
phenomena. For example, ingestion of a psychedelic
substance is a physiological event that has specific neural
effects, such as the stirnulation of 52 receptor sites
(Levinthal 1996), yet has perceptual and cognitive as
well as experiential effects sotrre of which can be
profound and persist fbr years as in the case of seminary
students given psilocybin prior to a Good Friday service
(Doblin 1991). The second thing to note is the lack of
any widely accepted links between these dorrains of
discourse. In fact, there has been considerable attention
drawn to the presence of the explanatory gaps between
these domains with much debate concerning the inability
to account fbr experience in physiological and
cornputational terrns. The third thing to note is that, while
both bodies and experiences seem to be eminently
accessible to an individual, the "tniddle" layer, the
computational, r.nay not exist except as a theoretical
construct. "Mentalese", the purporled fbrmal language of
the brain, along with the necessary axious and rules of
classical logic necessary fbr the processing of
information in a nranner analogous to that in a cotnputer,
has been called into question (Barwise 1986). And
whcreas parallcl distributcd processing mcdels arose
fior.n neural networks through a process of abstraction,
they have become so far removed fiom the actual
biological processes they initially represented that what it
is about the brain of which these are Irrodels reuains to
be seen (Hanson & Burr 1990, Smolensky 1988).
3 Definitions of Consciousness
What are we talking about when we talk about
consciousness? There are four tttain categories of
referents for the terur consciousness as described in
Baru5s (Baru5s 1987, 1990, 1992). At the most basic
level, consciouSnessl is the characteristic of an organisr.n
in a running state that entails the registration, processing
and acting on infbnlation as deuronstrated by the
organism's behaviour. Rather than getting into a debate
about a minimum level of processing, consciousnessl can
be considered to be a variable. Sitttilarly, rather than
placing restrictions on the types of organisn.rs that would
qualify, such as larger tnal.uurals and hutttans, one can
apply the term to any entity that tneets these criteria
keeping in mind that the rranner in which they are
instantiated may diff'er. That is to say, there is no reason
to disqualily cornputers. lt is important to note, with this
and some of the other defrnitions of consciousness, that,
in spite of sorne overlap, the concept of consciousness is
not equivalent to that of awareness. In parlicular,
whereas awareness is a passive property of an organistn,
consciousness has connotations of active agency as
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reflected in discussions concerning free will within
consciousness studies.
Behavioural consciousness2 designates the Ltse of the
tenn consciousness to ref-er to the explicit knowledge of
one's situation, tnental states or actions as opposed to
lack of such awareness as detnonstrated through one's
behaviour. Subjective consciousness2 refers to the streatn
of thoughts, f-eelings and sensations that occur for a
person, solne of wh ich are luore directly the focus of
attention than others. It is subjective consciousness2 that
is most often identified as consciousness (Baru5s 1990).
The problertt, of course, is that a person's experiences as
such are private and inaccessible to the metnbers of a
scientific colnmunity. Behavioural consciousness2 is the
operationalization of subj ective consciousn€SS2 so as to
make it available tbr objective str"rdy. Conversely, having
identified objective criteria fbr consciousness, one could
infer subj ective consciousness2 fiorn the presence of
behavioural consciousresS2. In practice this applies to
nrachines, whereby one would rnaintain that a machine
that can pass the Turing test, that is to SoY, a nlachine
behaviourally indistinguishable fion-r a human with
regard to its information-processing capabilities, is
conscious. While this is clearly a logical error, sollle
researchers have insisted that subjective consciousness2
must be inferred fiom the presence of behavioural
consciousnessz (e.g., Lycan 1 987).
There are those who have rnaintained that consciousness
is lltore fundamental than indicated in the first three
refel ents. That it is not that consciousness is the
subjective stream of experience but that it is the sense of
existence that allows for the possibility of there being a
subjective streatn at all. usually this is accol-llpanied by
the contentions that there is a self for whotn experience
occurs and that states of pure consciottsness without
objects are possible. Thus, consciousness3 is the sense of
existence of the subject of tnental acts. This is a
defrnition given in subjective terms with no operational
equivalent although it has sometimes been reif-ied as an
instance of subjective consciousllesS2 (e.g., Natsoulas
I eB6).
4 Consciousness Strrveys
It does not take long for sottteone interested in
consciousness to notice the disparity of ideas abor"rt
consciousness in the acadenric literatr"rre. These ideas
appear to follow the beliefs of individual investigators, in
particular, their fundanrental belief-s along the nraterial-
transcendent dinrension that underlies Western culture
(Baru5s 1990, 1992). In order to empirically test this
contention, Robert Moore and I developed, through a
nunrber of stages, an instrutnent that could be used for
nreasuring belief-s about consciousness and reality
(Baru5s 1990, Baru5s & Moore 1989,1992).
In an initial study in 1986, we circulated a consciousness
questionnaire to academics and professionals chosen on
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the basis of the likelihood that someone from their
discipline would write about consciousness in the
academic literature (Baru5s 1990). We received 334
completed copies of the questionnaire. The participants
had a rnean age of 44 years,27o/o were wolren, 67Yo had
obtained a doctorate, 42o/o were allied with psychology,
l2Yo with physics, 6Yo with philosophy, while smaller
numbers represented a variety of other disciplines
(BaruSs & Moore 1992). A material-transcendent
dimension clearly emerged with items about reality and
consciousness intertwined with one another.
The material pole of this dimension is characterized by
agreement with staternents that reality is physical in
nature and that science is the proper way in which to
know it. Consciousness is thought to errrerge frorn neural
activity or information processing, to always be about
something, and is defined as consciousnessl or
behavioural consciousness2. A conservatively
transcendent position is deflned by irnportance placed on
meaning in life and adherence to traditional religious
belief's. Subjective aspects of consciousness are
enrphasized with subjective consciousness2 and
consciousness3 as preferred defrnitions. Not surprisingly,
consciousness is perceived to give n.reaning to life and to
provide evidence of a spiritual reality. At the
transcendent pole is an extraordinarily transcendent
position whereby not only is the ontological hegemony
of physical reality questioned but relegated to the status
of a byproduct of consciousness. Respondents tending
toward this position were lrore likely to claim to have
haC anclnalous expcricnces such as out-of.body
experiences, to believe in paranormal phenomena such as
extrasensory perception and the continuation of lif'e after
death, and to tlnd value in inner exploration. Universal
consciousness is the goal of self'-transfbrmation as well
as the key that rnakes the process of change possible.
Rather than deflnitions that apply to the waking state of
consciousness, altered states of consciousness are
enrphasized (Baru5s 1990, 1992; Baru5s & Moore 1989,
1e92).
Using a more recent version of the initial instrument,
called the Belief's About Consciousness and Reality
Questionnaire, a consciousness survey was conducted of
participants at the scientific rreeting Toward a Science of
Consciousness 1996 'Tucson II'. Two hundred and
twelve completed questionnaires were received of which
29Yo were fiom wornen and 56Yo fiom those who had
earned a doctorate. The mean age ofrespondents was 50.
A broad range of disciplinary categories fiom the natural
sciences to arts and hunranities was represented. The
overall score of 18.3 on the global Transcendentalism
scale was higher than that of 1.2 for the 1986 sample
with a range of possible scores fror.n Sl14 to 114. This
may be due to a younger cohort fbr the 1996 study or to
more transcendent beliefs of researchers with an actual
rather than possible interest in consciousness. Those with
an interest in neural correlates ofconsciousness tended to
have low scores while those with an interest in
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phenomenology and culture had high scores. Thus the
dornains of discourse concerning consciousness are
dominated by particular beliefs. Physiological aspects of
consciousness are likely to be discussed by materialists
while experiential aspects by transcendentalists (Baru5s
& Moore 1998).
While it is often thought that science should proceed
without interference from the biases of the scientists
carrying out the research, such is clearly not the case for
consciousness studies. In particular, an investigator's
contention that she has had anomalous experiences such
as mystical or out-of-body experiences appears to incline
her toward a transcendent position with its attendant
emphasis on the primacy of consciousness. This
dependence is not surprising given that the study of
consciousness is concerned with subjective experiences
that are accessible as such only to each investigator for
herself (Baru5s 1990, 1992, 1996).
5 Changes in Students' Beliefs
Given the importance of beliefs about consciousness and
reality for the study of consciousness, a question arises
concerning the conditions under which a person's beliefs
about consciousness and reality would change. One
situation in which they could change rr-ray be a university
course in which transcendental issues are explicitly
addressed as part of the course curriculurr. Such a
situation was presented in some of the classes taught by
the author. Students' spontaneous comments concerning
the courses had indicated that, in solre cases, their belief's
had changed. Hence, in a continuation of our earlier
research, Robert Moore and I decided to docurnent those
changes. It was hypothesized that students' beliefs would
rrove in the direction of their instructors' beliet's.
For the 1995596 and 1996-97 school years, students in
rny undergraduate Hun.ranistic Psychology and
Consciousness courses, taught at a small, Canadian,
liberal arts, Catholic college, were given the Beliefs
About Consciousness and Reality Questionnaire at the
beginning of classes in Septernber, around the time of the
mid-year exan-rination in December and again around the
tirne of the final examination in April. Students in these
classes were presented with data challenging materialist
assumptions about the nature of reality and were required
to understand the substance of transcendentalist
argunrents. Also during 1995-96 students in a
Psychology of Creativity class taught by another
instructor at the same institution and students in an
Introductory Psychology course taught by yet another
instructor at a separate but comparable small, Canadian,
liberal arts, Catholic university were also administered
the questionnaire using the sarne schedule. In addition,
during the 1996-97 school year, students in rny
undergraduate Statistics for Psychology course were
included in the study in the same manner as the others. In
all cases, students were assured that their responses to the
questionnaire would not be observed until all grades fbr
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the course had been subn-ritted.
Analysis of the reliability of the Transcendentalism scale
of the Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality
Questionnaire using all of the student data gives values
for Cronbach's alpha of .88 (n :220), .89 (r: 145) and
.92 (n : l4l) for each of the consecutive administrations.
Thus, the instrument has good reliability when
administered to students. Changes in students' beliefs
between the initial and final administrations of the
questionnaire for students who completed it on both of
those occasions are given in Table 1 .
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Clearly there are many influences on a students' beliefs
of which an instructor's beliefs in a single course are
only one possibility. The data indicate that there may be
an institutional effect of moving students
toward transcendent beliefs irrespective of the beliefs of
single individual instructors at the particular college at
which I and the Psychology of Creativity instructor
teach. The effect was not observed at the university at
which the Introductory Psychology course was taught.
Alternatively, since the effect was only observed for
courses that I teach it may be that I have an effect on
students' beliefs without explicit discussion of
transcendental issues that overrides other influences on
Table I
Within Subjects Analysis of Variance for Changes in Students' Scores on Transcendentalism Scale of
Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality Questionnaire
Class Years N
Initial Final
FM ,SD M
^SD
Humanistic &
Consciousness
t99s-96 &
t996-97
4l 31.10 32.06 45.72 33.60 2l .19*
Statistics t996-97 24 24.25 2t.66 33.96 24.31 24.01*
I nstructor t99s-96 1 7 4.00 8l .00
I ntroductory t995-96 57 13.51 I 8.65 14.16 19. l5 0. l3
Instructor I 995 -96 I 4 5.00 43.50
Creativity t99s-96 7 35.50 14.69 43.93 2l .s6 t.45
I nstructor t99s-96 I 20.50 23.50
*significance level p <.0005.
n refers to the number of participants
M refers to the mean score on the Transcendentalism Scale
,SD refers to the standard deviation
F refers to the F test statistic for within subjects analysis of variance
While high to begin with, as expected, students' scores in
my Humanistic Psychology and Consciousness classes
moved in the transcendent direction during the school
year. Students'scores in the Introductory Psychology
course remained the same despite the fact that the
instructor's scores were numerically higher than the class
mean. Students' scores in the Psychology of Creativity
class increased numerically although not to a statistically
significant degree, despite class means numerically
higher than the instructor's scores. Surprisingly,
students' scores in my Statistics for Psychology course
also moved in the transcendent direction even though
there was no explicit discussion of transcendental issues
in that class.
students. In either case, what the data reveal is that
beliefs about consciousness and reality can change
during an undergraduate course, at least as measured by
the Belief's About Consciousness and Reality
Questionnaire and that lnore research is needed to
understand the reasons for the changes that occur.
This research has implications for the study of
consciousness. What one talks about, what definitions
one is willing to adopt and what attributes consciousness
may have are tied to beliefs about consciousness and
reality of the investigators doing the talking. In addition
to anomalous experiences, education may influence the
beliefs of investigators and hence appears to play a
significant role in contemporary consciousness studies.
Those entrained in materialist interpretations of reality
OVERVIEW OF CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
and those exposed to transcendentalist arguments may
reflect the respective biases of their instructors in their
research. This is an issue of fundamental importance for
the study of consciousness.
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